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We extend the standard quality-ladder model with heterogeneous workers by in-
cluding efficiency wages and unions. We find that higher union bargaining power
leads to a negative relationship between growth and unemployment. An increase
in the supply of human capital, however, on the one hand induces firms to sub-
stitute high-skilled labour for jobs previously performed by low-skilled individu-
als and on the other hand, increases the demand for low-skilled labour as their
productivity rises due to the higher skill-intensity. Depending on which effect
dominates, either a positive or negative relationship between the growth and
unemployment rates results.
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Empirical data on unemployment shows several stylised facts for the OECD coun-
tries. First, since the mid-nineties the unemployment rate is slowly starting to
fall. In fact, as can be seen by the “Greencard” debate in Germany, by which a
large number of software programmers are to be enticed to come and work in
Germany for several years, there are some branches of the economy which seem
to be suffering from a severe shortage of workers. This is just one example of
the fact that all analysis of unemployment must take different skill levels into ac-
count. A closer look at the empirical data confirms that low-skilled unemployment
rates are now much higher (in absolute terms and also relative to high-skilled un-
employment) than they were in the 1970s (see, e.g. Nickell, Bell 1997 and
OECD 1997) and it is this rise in unskilled unemployment which contributes a
large share to the rise in total unemployment. In Germany, for example, in 1998
the unemployment rate for workers with only a high-school diploma was more
than six times as high as the corresponding rate for individuals with a university
degree (see Reinberg 1999 for more detail). Second, although the unemploy-
ment rate for the “low-skilled” (i.e individuals with a high-school diploma) has
always been higher than the corresponding rate for the “high-skilled” (meaning
individuals who have graduated from a university), the difference between the
two rates has grown substantially in the nineties. One of the main reasons at-
tributed to this growing gap that is normally stated in the literature is the role
of (skilled-biased) technical change in modern economies. Third, although the
supply of skilled labour has increased dramatically in the last twenty years (see,
for example, Acemoglu 2000 and Gregg, Manning 1997) wage inequality
between low- and high-skilled wages has increased sharply in the United States
and other countries with “liberalised” labour markets, whilst Continental Europe
and the Scandinavian countries still have more or less the same degree of wage
inequality as in the eighties, but have suffered from a substantial and persistent
increase in unemployment. In the European context, one of the causes for this
constant wage differential that is stated is the role of labour market institutions
in general, and that of unions in particular. Fourth, on a balanced growth path,
the unemployment rate is constant.
This paper integrates these empirical observations by extending the quality-ladder
2
growth model with endogenous technical change and heterogeneous workers as in
Grossman, Helpman (1991, Ch.5) in two respects. First, we introduce unions
which represent the interests of the low-skilled workers. Second, although not all
low-skilled are in fact members of a union, due to “fair-wage” considerations, the
negotiated wage between unions and employers affects the wage rate of all low-
skilled workers in the economy. This means that union wage coverage is in fact
far larger than the mere number of union members suggests.
There is without doubt a large literature on growth and unemployment in which
most articles can be put into two major categories. First, there are models which
combine Schumpeter’s idea of creative destruction with matching models of
unemployment, see, for example, Aghion, Howitt (1994). Second, there are
models which analyse the interaction between labour and capital, see, for ex-
ample Blanchard (1998). Very few papers, however, have analysed how pre-
cisely unions affect the unemployment and growth rates. Notable exceptions
are Bräuninger (2000) and Stadler (1999) who both, however, treat labour
as homogeneous.1 In the model by Bräuninger (2000) which is based on an
overlapping-generations growth model, higher union bargaining power causes un-
employment to increase and leads to a decrease in the savings of the young so
that a negative relationship between growth and unemployment arises. Stadler
(1999) on the other hand, finds that an increase in union bargaining power causes
both a higher growth and unemployment rate. This positive relationship in his
model results due to the assumption that the labour market in the research sector
is perfectly competitive so that the net effect of higher union bargaining power
is to shift labour into the research sector.
The economy considered here produces two final goods, a traditional one whose
technology remains constant, and a composite high-tech manufacturing good
which is produced using a multitude of intermediate goods. These intermediate
goods are constantly being improved by researchers working in a separate sector.
We find that an increase in the supply of skills (or human capital) always leads
to a higher growth rate, but the effect on the unemployment rate is ambiguous.
The reason for this ambiguity is that a higher level of human capital will also
1 See also de Groot (2000) for a recent book devoted to the subject of growth and unemploy-
ment. This book also includes a chapter analysing the effects of unions, but again assuming
that all workers are homogeneous.
3
raise the productivity amongst the low-skilled. Further, if the size of the popu-
lation is constant, the supply of low-skilled workers decreases. Both effects raise
the low-skilled wage rate. For a small elasticity of substitution between high- and
low-skilled labour, for example when the production technology is specified as
a Cobb-Douglas function, the resulting increase in demand due to the higher
productivity more than outweighs the substitution effect induced by the higher
relative low-skilled wage. These results are reversed for“high”values of the substi-
tution elasticity, in which case both the growth and unemployment rates increase.
The relationship between growth and unemployment is unambiguously negative
if union bargaining power rises. In this case, the low-skilled wages increase al-
though there is neither a corresponding increase in low-skilled productivity nor
a decrease in the supply of low-skilled labour. The resulting higher low-skilled
unemployment and real wage rate lower the effective research intensity leading
to a lower product-improvement rate and thereby to a lower growth rate.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents the formal model in which
all sectors of the economy are explained. The general equilibrium is derived in
Section 3 and builds the basis for Section 4, in which some comparative statics
are presented. Section 5 concludes.
2 Behaviour of Firms and Households
2.1 Production of Consumer Goods
There are two final goods produced in the economy: T denotes the quantity of a
“traditional”homogeneous good which is not improved over time. The production
technology is assumed to be constant returns to scale with low- and high-skilled
labour as inputs. However, it is assumed that this sector has the lowest high-skilled
labour intensity. Further, firms operating in this sector face perfect competition
on the goods market. Therefore, the price pT of the traditional good is given by
pT = cT (wLT , wHT ) (1)
where wLT and wHT are the nominal wage rates in the traditional sector of low-
and high-skilled labour respectively, and cT denotes unit costs. The resulting
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demand for low-skilled labour can be derived by applying Shepard’s Lemma
which yields
LT = aLT (wLT , wHT )T (2)
with aLT as the partial derivative of the unit cost function with respect to low-
skilled wages. The corresponding demand for high-skilled labour is
HT = aHT (wLT , wHT )T (3)
The other final good is a high-technology manufacturing good which is produced
using a whole range of intermediates which are constantly being improved with
respect to quality. Assuming a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas tech-











where xj, j = 1, . . . , n denotes the various input goods which are each produced
in a single intermediate sector. Each input can be of a different quality grade,
arrayed along the rungs of a known quality ladder. Every time there is a successful
innovation in sector j, the quality of xj is improved by a constant factor λ > 1. If
the lowest quality of an intermediate good available at time t = 0 is normalised
to one in each sector, then the highest quality available in sector j is λmj , where
mj = 0, 1, 2, . . . denotes the number of quality improvements up to the present.
The highest quality available at each point in time defines the state-of-the-art or
top-of-the-line components.
As shown below, firms with the current highest quality good in sector j will charge
a limit-price, so that their good has the lowest quality-adjusted price. This means
that only the highest quality good in each intermediate sector will be demanded,









The minimum quality-adjusted price for each variant xj is pxj/λ
mj . Therefore,
the price index pM which can be interpreted as the minimum cost of purchasing
5
one unit of the composite good M , can be determined by summing up over all n









It can also be seen from equation (5) that the intermediate goods in each market
j are perfect substitutes for another if one adjusts for quality. Further, seeing as
the elasticity of substitution between any pair of intermediate products is equal to
one, all components will be used in equal quantities. Therefore, the intermediate
output index becomes
M = AMX (7)
where AM defines the average quality and X = nx the aggregate output (number
of varieties multiplied with the output per variety) of intermediates. If each in-
dustry has its own Poisson-process with instantaneous arrival rate ιj, summing
over all industries means that in the time interval τ , the total number of expec-
ted quality improvements will be I(τ) =
∫ τ
0
ι(t)dt. This means that the average
quality of the varieties is
AM(τ) = λ
I(τ) (8)
Production of the intermediate goods is assumed to be more human capital inten-
sive than in the traditional sector, but less intensive than in the research sector.
All firms producing the intermediate goods have identical cost functions given by
cxj(wLxj , wHxj) (9)
As the qualities of the components in each intermediate market j differ, the tech-
nological leader has the ability to capture the entire market demand by charging
a quality-adjusted price which is marginally lower than that of his or her nearest
competitor. With unit costs in the intermediate sector as given by equation (9),
the optimal limit-pricing strategy is2
pxj = λcxj(wLxj , wHxj) (10)
2 See Stadler (1999) or Barro, Sala-i-Martin (1995, Ch. 7) for models in which one final
good is produced using homogeneous labour and a quality-adjusted intermediate good. In this
case, depending on the innovation size λ, firms can either engage in monopoly pricing if the
quality improvements are “large” – Aghion, Howitt (1998, Ch. 2) label these innovations as
“drastic” – or in limit-pricing if quality improvements are “small”.
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which implies a low-skilled labour demand in this sector of
LX = aLX(wLX , wHX)X (11)
and
HX = aHX(wLX , wHX)X (12)
for high-skilled labour, where agX denotes the partial derivative of the cost
function in the intermediate goods sector with respect to labour of skill-group
g ∈ {L, H}.
From equation (10), profits πxj for a market leader can be written as
πxj = pxjxj − cxjxj
= pxjxj(1− 1/λ) (13)
If market leaders invest in research efforts at the further improvement of their
good, then by the same argument as above, the maximum price they could charge
would be λ2cxj . In this case they would earn a profit of pxjxj(1 − 1/λ2). This
means that the marginal gain from being two steps ahead of the closest rival is
(1/λ)(1−1/λ) which is strictly less than the additional profit that would occur if
it is possible to displace a current monopolist in another sector. Therefore, due to
this “replacement effect” (Tirole 1988, 392), it is never optimal for the current
market leader in sector j to undertake further research aimed at improving the
quality of his own product. The knowledge required to improve the quality of
the intermediate goods is obtained by researchers working in a separate sector
discussed in the next section.
2.2 Research
The research technology exhibits constant returns to scale and requires both low-
and high-skilled labour. As the economy modelled here is a developed one, we
assume that the research sector is the most human capital intensive. The unit
cost function in this sector is given by cR(wLR, wHR) from which labour demand
needed to achieve a research intensity ι in this sector is derived as
LR = aLR(wLR, wHR)ι (14)
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HR = aHR(wLR, wHR)ι (15)
with aLR and aHR as the respective partial derivatives of the cost function with
respect to low- and high-skilled wages.
Innovations are financed through the emission of stocks. If a firm has a successful
innovation, it will achieve a stock market value of v arising from the expected
profit streams that a market leader enjoys. Therefore, any investor can purchase
a share which, during the time interval dt, pays a dividend of vdt with probability
ιdt. At a research intensity of ι, total research costs during the time interval dt are
given by (aLRwLR + aHRwHR)ιdt. Given unit research costs of cR, each research
firm maximises vιdt−cRιdt which requires an infinite amount of research if v > cR
and zero research and no quality improvements if v < cR. Hence, finite research
investments which lead to positive quality growth in equilibrium only occur if
v = cR(wLR, wHR) (16)
If fj(m, τ) denotes the probability that the product j will be improved m times
during the time interval τ , then by the law of large numbers, f(m, τ) also rep-
resents the fraction of industries which experience m improvements in this time
interval. Assuming that the arrival rate of new innovations in each market follows
a Poisson-process results in a growth rate for the intermediate index given by
Ṁ
M
= ι ln λ (17)
In general equilibrium, the expected discounted value of a firm in the research
sector is zero. Therefore, sectors with“high”profit flows also incur“high”expected
research costs or have shorter time periods in which they realise the profit flows.
This means that each industry has its own specific speed at which the quality
of the good is improved and that the macroeconomic growth level is simply the
average speed of quality improvements across all sectors.
This completes the production side of the economy. Demand for these goods is
determined by household behaviour which is analysed in the next section.
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2.3 Households
The economy consists of N infinitely-lived dynasties. Each household consumes
CT units of the traditional good and the amount CM of the high-tech good.
Assuming that households have a common rate of time preference ρ and that the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution is equal to one, means that households




e−ρt [φ ln CM(t) + (1− φ) ln CT (t)] dt, 0 < φ < 1 (18)
subject to the intertemporal budget constraint∫ ∞
0
e−rtpCCdt ≤ W (0)
where pCC = pT CT + pMCM are total consumption expenditures and W (0) is
the present value of the household’s assets at time t = 0 which are composed
of future labour and interest income. Solving this intertemporal optimisation
problem yields the Keynes-Ramsey rule
Ċ
C
= r − ṗC
pC
− ρ (19)
Using the normalisation that aggregate spending E(t) = pCC is equal to one in
all periods, it follows from (19) that
r = ρ (20)
With this normalisation and given the above utility function means that in the
steady-state consumers will devote a fraction φ of their spending on the high-
tech good M and the remainder on the traditional good T . From this we can
infer that demand for the manufacturing good equals φ/pM and that for the
traditional good T is (1− φ)/pT .
Further, due to, for example, different learning abilities amongst individuals, a
fraction s of the population N is high-skilled and consequently, a fraction (1− s)
is low-skilled.3
3 See, for example, Stokey (1991) and Lucas (1993), for models where the number of high-
skilled workers is endogenously determined.
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2.4 Wages
One of the main justifications for unions and one of the reasons why workers
decide to become members is the expected redistribution effect. In the present
model, this means that on the one hand it is the low-skilled workers who can
profit most from union membership, with the aim of reducing the wage differential
between the two skill groups. On the other hand, this implies that high-skilled
workers have no incentive to join the union and the labour market for these
workers is fully competitive.4
As there are only rents in the intermediate sector, unions only have an incentive to
operate here. Therefore, low-skilled workers will earn different wages, depending
on which sector they work in. This corresponds to the empirical evidence of inter-
industry wage differentials.5
According to the right-to-manage approach which is adopted here, in each in-
termediate market j, unions negotiate the wage level with employers who sub-
sequently unilaterally set their profit-maximising level of labour demand. This









with w̄LX as the low-skilled reservation wage in the intermediate sector and β
as union bargaining power. Assuming that the two types of labour are gross
complements as inputs in production, means that if no wage agreement is reached
with the union and the low-skilled workers go on strike, the firm is forced to
completely stop production and therefore has a negative fallback position π̄xj as it
would still have to pay the high-skilled workers their wages. Thus, the employer’s
net bargaining position which enters the Nash-product is given by
πxj − π̄xj = pxjxj − wLxjLxj (22)
4 See Agell, Lommerud (1992) for a model where workers do not know ex-ante whether they
will get a low or high-paying job so that both groups are interested in lowering the wage
differential.
5 See, for example, Gibbons, Katz (1992) and Haisken-DeNew, Schmidt (1999) for empir-
ical evidence and Dickens, Lang (1988) and Wapler (1999) for surveys of so-called “dual”
or“segmented” labour market theories which analyse theses types of wage differentials in more
detail.
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Inserting equation (22) into (21) and applying standard optimisation techniques




β(1− εx,L)εL,wL − εx,L + β + µ(1− β)
]
w̄LX (23)
where εL,wL < 0 denotes the elasticity of low-skilled labour demand with respect
to low-skilled wages in the intermediate sector and εx,L is the output elasticity
with respect to low-skilled labour, both of which will be constant given the con-
stant returns to scale production technology. Finally, with Rj ≡ pxjxj as the
revenue function of firm j in the intermediate sector and again making use of
the assumption of a constant returns to scale production function, means that
µ ≡ wLxjwHxj(∂Hxj/∂wLxj)/Rj < 0 is also a constant.
The low-skilled reservation wage is
w̄LX = (1− uL)wLX + uLb (24)
where uL is the low-skilled unemployment rate, wLX is the low-skilled wage paid
by other firms in the intermediate goods sector, and b are unemployment benefits
which are assumed to be strictly less than average low-skilled wages.7 Assuming
symmetric firms-union pairs, so that wLxj = wLX and inserting equation (24) into




β(1− εx,L) + [β(1− εx,L)εL,w − (εx,L − µ)(1− β)]uL
]
b (25)
It can be seen from equation (25) that an interior solution (i.e. a positive low-
skilled wage) only exists if there is unemployment, i.e. uL > 0. How high this
minimum unemployment rate is depends on the parameters of the production
function and on the degree of union bargaining power. If unemployment falls
below this critical level, the (nominal) wage would need to fall below the income
level guaranteed by unemployment benefits, so that no worker would accept a
6 A detailed appendix containing derivations of all important equations is available form the
author upon request.
7 For simplicity we do not include a government budget constraint as doing so and assuming
that unemployment benefits are financed by a lump-sum tax would not affect the qualitative
steady-state results of the model.
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job in this sector. For unemployment levels above this critical value, the low-
skilled wage is a negative function of unemployment, in other words, the mark-up
over unemployment benefits (which effectively determines the reservation wage)
decreases as the unemployment rate rises.
For simplicity, it is assumed that low-skilled wages in the research and traditional
sectors are identical. However, in line with the fair-wage hypothesis as first formu-
lated by Akerlof, Yellen (1990) and backed up by a large body of empirical
evidence, see, for example, Agell, Lundborg (1995) and Bewley (2000), it is
assumed that workers in these sectors compare the wages they receive with those
of similarly qualified workers in the intermediate sector. Only if they perceive
their wages as “fair”, are they prepared to provide effort and thereby contribute
to output.8
wLT = wLR ≥ ηwLX , η > 0 (26)
If there are only two levels that effort by low-skilled workers in the traditional and
research sectors can take on, namely either zero or a positive minimum amount,
then firms in these sectors have no incentive to pay higher wages than required
and equation (26) will hold with equality. Further, although from equation (25)
it is obvious that low-skilled wages in the intermediate sector are higher than
their market-clearing level, it would be theoretically possible for all low-skilled
workers who do not find a job in the unionised sector, to take up jobs in the other
sectors. It is therefore assumed that η > η∗ where η∗ is defined as the largest
value of η at which all unskilled workers not employed in the intermediate sector
would find employment in either of the other two sectors. The assumption that
the wage level agreed upon between unions and employers in one sector is treated
as a benchmark by firms in other branches of the economy, so that the actual
union wage coverage is larger than the number of unionised employees suggests,
is also in line with the empirical evidence for many Western European countries.9
8 See Grossman (2000) for a similar assumption in a fair-wage model. However, in his model,
low-skilled workers in the final goods sector make comparisons across skill groups, whereas
in the intermediate sector low-skilled workers compare their wages within their skill group.
It does not become clear, why otherwise identical workers should have different notations of
fair-wages.
9 For example, in Germany Franz (1999, Ch.7) calculates that, although only approximately
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The determination of wages fully closes the model so that it is now possible to
derive the equilibrium in the next section.
3 Equilibrium





The value of demand for the high-tech good M is φ, which in equilibrium must
be equal to the value of output in this sector. This equals total production costs
pMM which are given by the aggregate component costs pxX, i.e.
pMM = pxX = φ (28)
For the capital market to be in equilibrium, there cannot be any arbitrage possibil-
ities. This means that the expected return on any shares invested in an innovative
firm must be equal to the rate of return on a riskless asset. In the time interval
dt, these shares pay a dividend of πdt. With the probability (1 − ιdt), no other
firm will develop a successful innovation during this time interval, in which case
the current value of future profits (and thus the price of the shares) increases
by (v̇/v)dt. However, if another firm does innovate successfully (which happens
with the probability ιdt), this new firm captures all the demand in this market
so that the previous monopolist will earn zero profits in the future and thus the
capital owners incur a financial loss of v. Equating this dividend with that which
a riskless asset valued at v pays during the same time interval leads to:
πdt + v̇dt(1− ιdt)− vιdt = rvdt
Ignoring terms to the power of two and noting that in the steady-state equilibrium
v̇ = 0 leads to
π
v
= r + ι
30% of the workforce are members of a union, union wage agreements cover roughly 90% of
all work contracts. See also Franz et al. (2000) for a recent survey of union coverage amongst
manufacturing and service sector firms which comes to a similar result.
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which from equations (13), (16), (20) and (28) gives
(1− 1/λ)φ
ncR
= ρ + ι (29)
Amongst low-skilled workers, unemployment will occur so that the labour-market
condition for these workers is
aLR(wLR, wH)ι + aLX(wLX , wH)X + aLT (wLT , wH)T = (1− uL)(1− s)N (30)
The market for high-skilled labour always clears and is characterised by:
aHR(wLR, wH)ι + aHX(wLX , wH)X + aHT (wLT , wH)T = sN (31)
noting that by assumption aHR/aLR > aHX/aLX > aHT /aLT .
Using the equilibrium demand equations (27) together with (28) and the price-
setting equations (1) and (10), makes it possible to express the labour-market
equations (30) and (31) as
ηθLR(wLR, wH)cR(wLR, wH)ι +
φθLX(wLX , wH)
λ
+ η(1− φ)θLT (wLT , wH) =
wLX(1− uL)(1− s)N (32)
and
θHR(wLR, wH)cR(wLR, wH)ι +
φθHX(wLX , wH)
λ
+ (1− φ)θHT (wLT , wH) =
wHsN (33)
where θgk ≡ agkwgk/ck represents the share of labour of skill-group g ∈ {L, H} in
costs incurred in sector k ∈ {R, T,X}.
Equations (32) and (33) together with the zero-profit condition (29) endogenously
determine the steady-state innovation rate and factor prices, and by equation
(25), the equilibrium unemployment rate. This equilibrium is characterised by
constant wages in all sectors for both skill groups and positive unemployment
and growth rates.
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4 Growth and Unemployment
Using the fact that the proportional changes in the cost shares can be expressed as
θ̂Lk = θHk(1−σk)(ŵLk− ŵHk) and θ̂Hk = −θLk(1−σk)(ŵLk− ŵHk), where a “hat”
over a variable denotes the proportional rate of change, e.g. ŵLk ≡ dwLk/wLk
and σk is the (absolute) elasticity of substitution between low- and high-skilled
labour in sector k, as well as the condition θLkŵLk+θHkŵHk = ĉk (see, for example,
Jones (1965) for derivations), makes it possible to simultaneously analyse the
effects on the innovation rate ι as well as on the factor prices wLk and wHk caused
by, for example, a change in the fraction of the population that becomes skilled,











where the Φ-coefficients are defined as
Φ11 = −
{







Φ12 = [θHRσRLR + θHXσXLX + θHT σT LT − θHXLX − θHT LT ]/(1− uL)sN
Φ13 = LR/(1− uL)sN
Φ21 = [θLRσRHR + θLXσXHX + θLT σT HT − θLXHX − θLT HT ]/sN
Φ22 = −[θLRσRHR + θLXσXHX + θLT σT HT + θHXHX + θHT HT ]/sN
Φ23 = HR/sN
Noting from equation (25) that ∂uL/∂wLX < 0, means that the sign of determi-
nant of the above 3× 3-matrix Θ, can unambiguously be determined as
|Θ| = (Φ11Φ22 − Φ12Φ21)ι/(ρ + ι) + θHR(Φ21Φ13 − Φ11Φ23)+
θLR(Φ12Φ23 − Φ22Φ13)) > 0 (35)
10 As will become clear below, expressing all comparative-static effects as proportional changes,
makes it possible to explain the underlying economic effects more precisely and intuitively.
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(θLRσRHR + θLXσXHX + θLT σT HT + θHXHX+










θHT σT LT − θHXLX − θHT LT )
]
(36)
for the effect of a higher supply of skills on the low-skilled wage rate. This is
unambiguously positive only if σT , σX ≤ 1 and σR ≤ (ρ + ι)/ι. There are two
counteracting effects which determine whether low-skilled wages increase with a
higher supply of human capital or not. First, seeing as the size of the population is
constant, a higher supply of human capital automatically means that the supply of
low-skilled workers declines. Second, as shown below, the higher number of high-
skilled workers will always lead to a reduction in the relative high-skilled wage.
This means that the skill intensity in each sector rises whereby the productivity
amongst the remaining low-skilled individuals increases. For relatively low values
of the elasticities of substitution, for example if the production technology is
given by a Cobb-Douglas function with a unitary substitution elasticity, the
increased demand for low-skilled workers due to the increase in their productivity
will dominate the substitution effect, whereby the fall in the relative high-skilled
wage will cause firms to substitute high-skilled workers for low-skilled ones. In this
case, total demand for low-skilled workers increases, leading to a higher low-skilled
wage rate. For larger values of the elasticities of substitution, the substitution
effect outweighs the demand effect, so that now total demand and thereby wages
for the low-skilled decrease.11
11 Empirical estimations of the substitution elasticity between low- and high-skilled labour vary
greatly. For the U.S., Bound, Johnson (1992) and Katz, Murphy (1992) estimate (abso-
lute) values between 1.4 and 1.7. Estimates for Germany vary a great deal depending on the
economic sector and time period which is analysed. For example, whilst Entorf (1996) estim-
ates a value of 1 between low- and high-skilled blue-collar manufacturing workers and between
0.5 and 1.5 for white-collar workers, both Fitzenberger, Franz (1998) and Steiner, Wag-
ner (1998) find values in the range of 0.3 and 0.4. For an overview of these results and more
detailed estimates which differentiate between various sectors and between males and females,
see Steiner, Mohr (1998).
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θHRσRLR + θHXσXLX + θHT σT LT + θLXLX+








which is unambiguously negative only if HR > LR. However, seeing as the research
sector is the most skill intensive and the economy we are considering is a highly
developed one, it is realistic to assume that wages for high-skilled workers decrease
when the supply of skills rises. Even if HR < LR so that the high-skilled wage
increases, a comparison of equations (36) and (37) shows that the increase in the
high-skilled wage is always less than the corresponding rise in the low-skilled wage
level. This means that, as stated above, a higher level of human capital always
lowers the relative high-skilled wage.
Similarly, the connection between the supply of human capital and the growth







θHRσRLR + θHXσXLX + θHT σT LT + LX(θHR − θHX)+









θLT σT HT −HX(θHR − θHX)−HT (θHR − θHT )
}
> 0 (38)
As the research sector is the most skill-intensive in the economy, this sector be-
nefits most from increase in the supply of human capital. With more individuals
becoming highly skilled, the relative high-skilled wage falls, so that research costs
fall. The new equilibrium is therefore characterised by a higher research intensity
which leads to a faster innovation (and therefore higher growth) rate.











There are two counteracting effects which determine whether the unemployment
rate rises or falls with a higher supply of skills and thus whether there is a positive
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or negative relationship between the growth and unemployment rate. On the one
hand, a higher supply of skills automatically reduces the supply of low-skilled
workers so that there is a negative effect on the unemployment rate. On the other
hand, demand for these workers can either increase or decrease depending on
the production technology. For low elasticities of substitution in all sectors, i.e.
σT , σX ≤ 1 and σR ≤ (ρ+ι)/ι, the higher supply of skills leads to an increase in the
low-skilled wage rate. However, as shown above, in this case total demand for low-
skilled workers increases so that their unemployment rate falls while at the same
time the growth rate increases. This is the case if all sectors produce according
to a Cobb-Douglas output technology. For larger substitution elasticities, the
fall in low-skilled labour demand means that the net result of a higher supply of
skills is now a higher growth and unemployment rate.
Looking at the effects of union bargaining power on growth, we can use the same











where the Ψ-coefficients are defined as
Ψ11 = −
{








Ψ12 = [θHRσRLR + θHXσXLX + θHT σT LT−
θHXLX − θHT LT ]/[∂uL/∂β](1− s)βN
Ψ13 = LR/(1− s)βN
and the remaining coefficients the same as the corresponding Φ-coefficients in
equation (34).
The determinant of the above 3 × 3-matrix is always positive. Therefore, again










[θLRσRHR + θLXσXHX + θLT σT HT − θLXHX − θLT HT ] < 0 (41)
In this case, an increase in union bargaining power leads to higher low-skilled
wages (in all sectors) but there is no corresponding increase in productivity. This
lowers unskilled labour demand, thereby increasing their unemployment rate.
At the same time, with fewer low-skilled workers in the research sector, the pro-
ductivity of high-skilled labour in this sector declines, thereby lowering the growth
rate.
5 Conclusion
Although there is without doubt a large literature (but still little consensus) on
the connection between growth and unemployment, the role that unions play
has been largely neglected. Integrating unions into a quality-ladder model with
heterogeneous workers, allows us to analyse the effects of technical change on both
the growth and unemployment rate. Firms in the intermediate sector supplying
the highest quality good in their market, are able to set limit-prices and thus
make profits. For this reason, low-skilled workers in this sector are organised
in a union in order to capture some of the accruing rents. The wage level that
results through bilateral bargaining between unions and employers also affects
the wages workers in other sectors demand, so that union wage coverage is larger
than union membership numbers suggest. Within this framework, we find that
an increase in the supply of skills leads to a higher growth rate and may or may
not lower the unemployment rate amongst the low-skilled. If there is a “high”
elasticity of substitution between low- and high-skilled labour in all sectors, then
the unemployment rate will rise at the same time as the growth rate increases.
For “low” substitution elasticities, the opposite is true so that as the growth
rate increases, the unemployment rate falls. A negative relationship between the
growth and unemployment rate also results if union bargaining power rises in
which case a higher low-skilled unemployment rate lowers the effective research
intensity leading to a lower growth rate. However, because the low-skilled wage is
higher than it would be without unions, we find exactly what can be observed on
the two sides of the atlantic: the United States with its larger wage differential
19
but also higher growth rates than its Continental European counterparts which
have a lower wage inequality but also lower growth rates as a result.
20
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senschaftliches Seminar Ottobeuren 25, Tübingen, 139–170.
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